Recent research has shown that gross capital inflows and outflows are positively correlated and highly procyclical. This poses a puzzle since most theory predicts that capital inflows and outflows should be negatively correlated, and while capital inflows should be procyclical, capital outflows should be countercyclical. This previous work has examined the behavior of aggregate capital inflows and outflows (capital flows between a country and the rest of the world). This paper shows that bilateral capital inflows and outflows (flows between a pair of countries) are also positively correlated and strongly procyclical. This empirical finding poses a new puzzle. The data suggests that any model that can explain capital flows at the bilateral level needs to rely on market incompleteness and non-diversification. In addition, the data suggests that this positive correlation and procyclicality is largely the feature of crisis episodes. After controlling for crisis episodes, we find that bilateral capital flows move positively with GDP in the country receiving the capital and co-move negatively in the country sending the capital.
Introduction
The European Central Bank established swap lines to provide euro liquidity to banks in Romania and Bulgaria in July 2015. A large fraction of the banking assets in Bulgaria and Romania are controlled by the a¢ liates of Greek parent banks. There was a fear that the brewing liquidity crisis in the Greek banking sector in the summer of 2015 could trigger a retrenchment by these Greek multi-national banks, leading to a sharp withdraw of liquidity from Romania and Bulgaria. Thus there was a fear that Greek banks may respond to a sudden stop in Greek capital in ‡ows by decreasing their own capital out ‡ows, leading to the spread of the crisis. (Financial Times, July 16, 2015) Recent research has shown that gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are highly correlated and both are procyclical. (Broner et al., 2013) This itself poses a puzzle that cannot be reconciled with a model where capital ‡ows to its most productive use. After all, the workhorse international real business cycle model in Backus et al. (1994) is focused on explaining the positive correlation between GDP and net capital ‡ows in the data. 1 In the model capital ‡ows into a country following a positive productivity shock. Thus in this framework, gross capital in ‡ows are highly procycical and gross out ‡ows and countercyclical, or in the words of Backus et al. (1995) , "make hay while the sun shines".
Net capital in ‡ows are equal to gross capital in ‡ows minus gross capital out ‡ows. The literature describing the e¤ects of net capital ‡ows discusses the e¤ects of capital ‡ow surges and sudden stops, as in Calvo et al. (1996) and . 2 A surge is a sudden increase in net capital ‡ows and a sudden stop is a sudden decrease. However, as
shown by Forbes and Warnock (2012) , when capital in ‡ows and capital out ‡ows are treated 1 Net capital ‡ows are simply the negative of the current account. 2 Recent studies that have considered the causes of changes in net capital in ‡ows include Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Ghosh et al. (2014) , among others. Papers that measure the e¤ects of changes in net capital in ‡ows include any paper that measures the macroeconomic e¤ect of current account imbalances. See Rose and Spiegel (2011) , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011; 2012) , and Frankel and Saravelos (2012) for some recent examples. These papers usually construct a series for net capital in ‡ows by simply taking the negative of the current account, or taking the change in o¢ cial reserves minus the current account if one wishes to concentrate on private capital ‡ows.
as two separate variables, the list of capital ‡ow episodes expands. Forbes and Warnock (2012) de…ne a surge to be a sudden increase in gross capital in ‡ows and a stop to be a sudden decrease in in ‡ows, but they also de…ne a ‡ight to be a sudden increase in capital out ‡ows and a retrenchment to be a sudden decrease in capital out ‡ows. Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) argue that many observed sudden stops in net ‡ows data are actually sudden ‡ights. Forbes and Warnock (2012) show how due to this positive correlation between gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows, what we would normally identify as a surge in gross capital in ‡ows may not appear as a surge in net capital in ‡ows. This would happen if an increase in gross capital in ‡ows is accompanied by an increase in gross capital out ‡ows (in the words of Forbes and Warnock, a capital surge accompanied by a capital ‡ight). At the other extreme, a sudden stop in gross capital in ‡ows may not appear as a sudden stop in net capital in ‡ows if the sudden stop in gross in ‡ows is accompanied by a sharp retrenchment in gross capital out ‡ows. They identify many episodes during the recent crisis where using data on net capital ‡ows alone, we would actually claim that a country experienced a surge in capital ‡ows. However, in nearly all of these countries, the surge in net capital in ‡ows during the crisis was not due to a surge in capital in ‡ows but rather was due to a sharp retrenchment in capital out ‡ows. At the same time, using a de…nition based on net capital in ‡ows, a handful of countries experienced a sudden stop during the crisis, but using a de…nition based on gross capital in ‡ows, many more countries experienced a sudden stop. Broner et al. (2013) also discuss the movements in gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows around the time of a crisis. They show that when there is a crisis in a given country gross capital in ‡ows into that country decrease (a sudden stop), but gross capital out ‡ows decrease as well (a retrenchment). When describing the sharp fall in gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows in the recent crisis, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) argue that a sharp increase in global risk led to retrenchment, and Giannetti and Laeven (2012) …nd strong evidence of retrenchment in what they call a " ‡ight-to-home" (as opposed to a " ‡ight-to-quality") as lenders cut their international exposure during the crisis. Tille and Van Wincoop (2008) construct a model where retrenchment can take place if foreign investors are less informed than domestic investors, and crises increase this information asymmetry. Tille and Van Wincoop (2010) construct a dynamic portfolio choice model where there is time-variation in second moments that affect home and foreign portfolios di¤erently, and if this time variation in second moments is su¢ cient, the model will generate a positive correlation between gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
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From this it seems that an increase in global of country-speci…c risk around the time of a crisis and the tendency for that to drive retrenchment, or a " ‡ight-to-home", seems to explain this observed positive correlation between gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows. However, using a data source that allows us to study the behavior of bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows (that is, capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows between a pair of countries) this paper will show that bilateral gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows are themselves highly correlated, and that this is true even after controlling for both a global risk factor and country-speci…c risk factors.
If capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows between a pair of countries are highly correlated because of a global risk shock that leads to global retrenchment, then after controlling for a global factor, bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows would not be positively correlated, and may be negatively correlated. If instead of a global factor, there is a factor speci…c to one of the two countries, like a banking crisis in one country, then this should lead to a decline of capital in ‡ows into the crisis-struck country and if it leads to heightened risk aversion among residents of that country, it may lead to a retrenchment. In this way a country-speci…c factor may also lead to a positive correlation between bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows, but after controlling for aggregate capital ‡ows in both countries, bilateral capital ‡ows would be uncorrelated, or perhaps negatively correlated. The fact that the conditional correlation of bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows is positive, even after controlling for both a global factor and country-speci…c 3 In a discussion of Broner et al. (2013 ), Bai (2013 mentions some other forces that might lead to a positive correlation between gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows, like multinational technology capital in McGrattan and Prescott (2010) , reserve accumulation in Bianchi et al. (2012) , or trade credits used to …nance highly correlated import and exports. In addition Walsh (2014) constructs a model where sovereign default can lead to highly correlated and procycical gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows. But the given the data we use in this paper (bilateral banking transactions), we abstract from those channels here since they tend to focus on FDI ‡ows, or government bond ‡ows and reserves.
aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows, poses a new puzzle.
Furthermore, with bilateral capital ‡ows we can observe the cyclicality of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in both the country sending the capital and the country receiving the capital.
Just as aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are both highly procyclical, bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows are procyclical as well. Bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows positively co-move with GDP growth in both countries in the country pair. We then separate the co-movement with GDP during a crisis and the co-movement during normal times. The evidence strongly suggests that this procyclicality of both in ‡ows and out ‡ows is primarily centered around crisis periods. Once we control for the cyclicality of capital ‡ows around the time of a crisis, capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows during normal periods follow the prescribed path from the international real business cycle literature. Capital in ‡ows tend to be procyclical and capital out ‡ows tend to be countercyclical; capital ‡ows to its most productive use, 'making hay while the sun shines'. This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will discuss some conceptual issues. The high conditional correlation between bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows, even after controlling for aggregate capital ‡ows, poses a puzzle. This section will review some recent work on networks in international banking that can possibly explain this puzzle. The bilateral capital ‡ows data is described in section 3. Section 4 discusses the correlation between bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and section 5 discusses the cyclicality of these bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Some sensitivity tests to test the robustness of these results are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Conceptual issues
Dynamic portfolio choice models emphasize that changes in country-speci…c risk are responsible for the observed positive correlation between aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
The study of bilateral capital ‡ows allows us to see that there is something more than the general story of risk and retrenchment that is driving capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The fact that both bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows are positively correlated, even after controlling for both a global factor and country-speci…c aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows suggests that there must be something that drives this positive correlation apart from shocks that would drive aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The fact that the procyclicality of both capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows tends to be a feature of crises suggests that these forces that drive this high bilateral correlation must be especially pronounced during times of …nancial or banking crises.
The most likely culprit: a combination of liquidity e¤ects and non-diversi…cation. Acharya Turning now to bilateral capital ‡ows, suppose these is a sudden fall in bilateral capital in ‡ows into country A from country B. Holding …xed aggregate capital in ‡ows into country
A from the rest of the world, if banks in country A are well diversi…ed, the drop in capital in ‡ows from country B will not lead to a liquidity squeeze in country A, and thus there is no reason that country A banks should retrench and reduce capital out ‡ows to country B.
But if a subset of banks in country A are over-exposed to country B both in assets and liabilities, then a fall in bilateral capital in ‡ows would mean that this subset of banks would be forced to retrench and capital out ‡ows from A to B would fall, even though total capital in ‡ows and most other banks in country A are una¤ected. Alternatively suppose all banks in country A are heavily exposed to country B, so capital in ‡ows into country A from the rest of the world (not including B) is not as signi…cant as bilateral capital in ‡ows from country B. If bilateral capital in ‡ows from B fall, banks in A may be faced with a liquidity squeeze would retrench leading to a fall in bilateral out ‡ows, even when holding …xed capital in ‡ows into country A from the rest of the world (not including B).
In a seminal paper on …nancial contagion, Allen and Gale (2000) Thus the literature on networks in international banking shows that banks, both individual banks and national banking systems, tend to be non-diversi…ed in their international claims and liabilities. The banking network literature has tended to focus on the role of these networks in …nancial contagion, but the results in this paper suggest that the e¤ects of banking networks and non-diversi…cation may also explain large macro phenomenon like the positive co-movement between gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Furthermore, in the theory this positive co-movement between gross in ‡ows and gross out ‡ows should be a feature of crisis periods, as both are strongly procyclical during a liquidity crisis as a sudden stop in capital in ‡ows may trigger a liquidity squeeze and a retrenchment in capital out ‡ows. If this is true then outside of crisis periods, capital ‡ows will follow a more regular pattern with procyclical in ‡ows and countercyclical out ‡ows.
That is exactly what we …nd in the data.
Data
Gross capital in ‡ows are de…ned as the net purchases of domestic assets by foreign residents, and gross capital out ‡ows are de…ned as net purchases of foreign assets by domestic residents.
Most papers that discuss capital ‡ows are concerned with capital ‡ows between a given country and the rest of the world. We will refer to these capital ‡ows as aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. We will refer to CI iW t as aggregate gross capital in ‡ows into country i from the rest of the world and CO iW t as aggregate gross capital out ‡ows from country i to the rest of the world. Net capital in ‡ows are simply given by CN iW t = CI iW t CO iW t .
For this data most papers rely on the IMF's Balance of Payments statistics International
Monetary Fund (2009). While this data is comprehensive in that it includes debt, portfolio, and FDI ‡ows, it only measures capital ‡ows between a given country and the rest of the world. Using a more disaggregated dataset, this paper will discuss bilateral gross capital ‡ows. Bilateral gross capital in ‡ows into country i from country j are de…ned as the net purchase of country i assets by country j residents, CI ijt , and bilateral gross capital out ‡ows from country i to country j are de…ned as the net purchase of country j assets by country i residents, CO ijt .
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The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) collects data on bilateral banking transactions. This Locational Banking Statistics data from the BIS has recently been used to study the channels of bilateral business cycle co-movement through integrated …nancial markets by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) . In addition, due to its bilateral nature, this data has been used to characterize cross-country banking networks (Minoiu and Reyes, 2013) . In this dataset, BIS reporting banks within a country (the set of BIS reporting banks encompasses most banks, especially ones engaged in international transactions) report their stock of assets and liabilities with all parties, both banks and non-banks in another country. The BIS collects this data from banks in reporting countries on their assets and liabilities in vis-a-vis countries. The data is potentially available quarterly from 1978 to 2014, but to maximize the country coverage in this study, it is possible to get good data from 29
reporting countries starting in 1995. There are many more vis-a-vis countries than reporting countries, but the analysis in this paper is restricted to pairs of reporting countries. This way the same capital ‡ows are observed twice, when country i is the reporting country and country j is the vis-a-vis country, and when country j is the reporting country and country i is the vis-a-vis country.
This data is collected as stocks at current prices and exchange rates, so due to valuation e¤ects simply taking the di¤erence between observations in any two subsequent quarters does not give us an accurate picture of the actual …nancial ‡ows from country i to country j over the quarter, but the BIS also produces a set of this data that has been corrected for these valuation e¤ects and is appropriate for analyzing …nancial ‡ows. This is of course not an exhaustive set of capital ‡ows. This BIS banking data cov‡owing out of the country, and this is recorded as positive gross capital out ‡ows. Similarly, if net purchases of domestic assets by foreign residents is positive, then there is capital ‡owing into the country and gross capital in ‡ows are positive. In this way, net capital ‡ows would be constructed by subtracting gross out ‡ows from gross in ‡ows, as in Broner et al. (2013) . This is commonly referred to as the simple asset/liability approach from BPM6 accounting.
Some studies instead follow direction of ‡ow principle from BPM5 accounting and consider that positive net purchases of foreign assets by domestic residents is a cash out ‡ow from the domestic country and is recorded with a negative sign. In this case, net capital ‡ows would be gross out ‡ow plus gross in ‡ows, as in Forbes and Warnock (2012) . ers mainly bank lending, and excludes FDI ‡ows and portfolio debt and equity ‡ows. The primary reason for this choice is data availability. This BIS banking data is the most comprehensive time series of bilateral time series capital ‡ow data available. 6 In addition, FDI ‡ows should be based more on long-term factors and less on cyclical factors. Available time series on portfolio ‡ows (like the EPRF) both have a shorter time series and more importantly, are restricted to capital in ‡ows from large …nancial centers. At the end of this section we will discuss some statistics that show that this BIS banking data provides a good proxy for actual capital ‡ows, as measured in the Balance of Payments statistics.
The valuation corrected change in liabilities of country i banks that are owed to counterparties in country j is simply the purchase of assets in country i by country j residents, or bilateral gross capital in ‡ows into country i from country j. Similarly, the valuation corrected change in assets of country i banks that are claims on country j are simply bilateral gross capital out ‡ows from country i to country j. The statistics CI ijt and CO ijt are constructed by normalizing these gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows by the sum of the GDP in countries i and j.
We can collect bilateral gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows for a total of 29 countries, so 406 country pairs. Given that capital ‡ows between these countries constitute the vast majority of global capital ‡ows, aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in country i would simply be de…ned as CO iW t = P k2fN = 2ig CO ikt and CI iW t = P k2fN = 2ig CI ikt , where the set N is the set of 29 countries in the study.
Later when calculating conditional correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, it will be useful to de…ne aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in country i from/to the rest of the world, not including country j , CI i=jt = P k2fN = 2i;jg CI ikt = CI iW t CI ijt and CO i=jt = P k2fN = 2i;jg CO ikt = CO iW t CO ijt . It is possible to compare our proxy series of aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows from the BIS data to the actual series of total aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows from the 6 The CPIS data of portfolio debt and equity ‡ows from the IMF is stocks and is not corrected for valuation e¤ects.
Balance of Payments data. Some sample statistics of aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in the Balance of Payments data and in our proxy series constructed with the BIS banking data are presented in table 1. The table shows that on average across the 29 countries in the study, the standard deviation of the capital in ‡ows or out ‡ows to GDP ratio in the Balance of Payments data is about 20%. The standard deviation of the proxy measures for capital ‡ows is a little less, although close. Furthermore, the correlation between the actual aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the proxy measures is about 0.66, indicating that these proxy measures can track the actual measures of capital ‡ows very well.
In addition, some of the regression models in this paper use a 0-1 banking crisis indicator variable to distinguish between the cyclicality of capital ‡ows in tranquil times and during crisis times. This indicator variable is taken from and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) . We also con…rm that these results are robust to an alternative banking crisis indicator variable developed in Laeven and Valencia (2013) . The banking crisis indicator variables are available at an annual frequency and the capital ‡ow data in this study is quarterly. We convert this annual crisis indicator variable into a quarterly variable by simply assuming that if the variable is equal to 1 in a given year, it is equal to on in each quarter of that year.
Correlation of Gross In ‡ows and Out ‡ows
The …rst step to understanding the cyclicality of these gross capital ‡ows is to observe that these gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are themselves highly correlated.
Why they are correlated is another question. Capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows could have a high unconditional correlation, but if that is simply due to a global factor like a global risk shock, then after we control for a global factor, the conditional correlation will not be positive. To test if a global factor alone is responsible for the positive correlation between aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, …rst regress aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows, CI iW t and CO iW t , on a time …xed e¤ect in a panel data regression across quarters and all 29 countries in the sample. The conditional correlation is simply the correlation between the residuals from these two regressions.
Conditional correlation in this panel data study can be calculated two ways, as correlation across countries in a given quarter, or correlation across time for a given country. Some simple statistics describing these cross-sectional or cross-time correlations are listed in the …rst and third columns of table 2. The table shows that the conditional correlation of aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, after controlling for a global factor, are still very positive. This tells us that a global factor alone is not responsible for the co-movement of aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
The next possibility is a country-speci…c risk shock. This could be a crisis in a given country. Capital in ‡ows into that country would of course fall, and if the heightened risk and risk aversion causes domestic residents to retrench, we would observe a positive correlation between aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and since the shock is country-speci…c and not a global factor, the conditional correlation would also be positive after controlling for a global factor.
Using only data on aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows we can't go any further in calculating conditional correlations. However, using data for bilateral capital ‡ows, we can calculate the conditional correlation between CI ijt and CO ijt , controlling for both a global factor and country-speci…c aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. If the country-shock is driving this positive correlation, then after controlling for aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows in both countries in the country pair, the conditional correlation between bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows will not be positive. To calculate this conditional correlation we regress CI ijt and CO ijt on a time …xed e¤ect, and aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows in countries i and j from/to the rest of the world, not including countries i and j: CI i=jt , CI j=it , CO i=jt , and CO j=it .
The correlation between bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, after controlling for both a global factor and country-speci…c factors, is shown in the second and fourth columns of table 2. The conditional correlation of these bilateral capital ‡ows is still positive and around 0:4, although it is less than the conditional correlation between aggregate capital ‡ows. This suggests that these country shocks do explain some of the positive correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, but not all of the positive correlation.
Another way to measure the strong co-movement between gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows is simply to regress gross in ‡ows on gross out ‡ows, and vice versa. We …rst run these two simple regressions using aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows:
(1)
and thus measures the co-movement between aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and aggregate gross out ‡ows, and measures the response of out ‡ows to a change in in ‡ows. Both country and period …xed e¤ects are included in each regression. The results from these regressions are presented in the top half of table 3. The results in the table show that aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and aggregate gross capital out ‡ows are highly correlated.
The regression in (1) is certainly informative about the co-movement between aggregate gross in ‡ows and aggregate gross out ‡ows, but of course it doesn't allow us to identify the drivers of these capital ‡ows.
The data for bilateral gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows allow us to test how these gross capital ‡ows are a¤ected by conditions in both the country sending the capital and the country receiving the capital. To test how bilateral capital ‡ows between a pair of countries is a¤ected by aggregate capital ‡ows in both the sending and the receiving country, we can run the following regressions:
where country-pair and period …xed e¤ects are included in each regression. In this regression, 1 measures the co-movement between bilateral gross in ‡ows into country i from country j and aggregate gross capital in ‡ows into country i, and 2 measures the co-movement between bilateral gross in ‡ows into country i from country j and aggregate capital out ‡ows from country j. Thus if there is an increase in aggregate capital in ‡ows into country i, that should lead to an increase in bilateral in ‡ows into country i from country j of 1 . Similarly, if
there is an increase in aggregate capital out ‡ows from country j, capital in ‡ows into country i from country j will increase by 2 . The second regression in (2) asks a similar question, except now the dependent variable is bilateral gross out ‡ows from country i to country j, so now we wish to measure how these bilateral ‡ows depend on aggregate gross out ‡ows from country i and aggregate gross in ‡ows into country j.
Alternatively we could run the following regressions:
In these regressions, if the estimates of 3 or 3 are signi…cantly greater than zero then that suggests that bilateral gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows between two countries are highly correlated, even after controlling for aggregate capital ‡ows. The results from these regressions are included in the …rst and third column of the tables in the bottom half of that when we control for bilateral capital out ‡ows from i to j, aggregate capital ‡ows in country i or country j are not near as important for explaining bilateral capital in ‡ows into i from j. Furthermore, the adjusted R 2 in the regressions in the second and fourth column is signi…cantly higher, indicating that cross-country pair variation in bilateral capital in ‡ows into country i from country j explains 31% of cross-country pair variation in bilateral capital out ‡ows from country i to country j, and vice versa.
Cyclicality of Capital In ‡ows and Out ‡ows
After establishing that bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are highly correlated, let us turn now to the cyclicality of these gross capital ‡ows. Using the panel of aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ow, we can estimate the following:
where Z iW t = CI iW t , CO iW t , or CN iW t and y it is the log change in real GDP in country i from period t 1 to period t . We begin by setting 2 = 0. In this case if The table shows that during normal times, the coe¢ cients of GDP growth are insigni…-cant, indicating that both aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are acyclical during normal times. However, the results show that during a crisis, aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are both highly procyclical. During a crisis, a one percentage point fall in GDP growth over the past year leads to a 3 percentage point decrease in aggregate gross capital in ‡ows and a 2 percentage point decrease in aggregate capital out ‡ows. 7 So during a crisis, 7 The e¤ect of GDP growth on capital in ‡ows during a crisis is
3 and the e¤ect on capital out ‡ows is
there is both a stop in aggregate capital in ‡ows and a retrenchment in aggregate capital out ‡ows.
These regressions using aggregate capital ‡ows allow us to measure the cyclicality of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in country i, but using bilateral gross in ‡ows and out ‡ows, we can measure how capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows react to macroeconomic conditions in both the sending and receiving countries. To do this we estimate the following regressions: The results in the second, fourth, and sixth columns remove the restriction
and allow the cyclicality of bilateral capital ‡ows to be di¤erent in normal times than in crisis times. The results show that the observed procyclicality of both bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows is because these capital ‡ows are procyclical during banking crisis periods. The results in the second column show that bilateral in ‡ows to country i from country j co-move negatively with GDP in country j while bilateral out ‡ows co-move positively with GDP in country j. Thus in non-crisis times, capital in ‡ows tend to be procycical and capital out ‡ows tend to be counter cyclical, exactly as conventional theory would predict.
Sensitivity tests
This BIS locational banking statistics records capital ‡ows from banks in a reporting country to all counterparties, both banks and non-banks in a vis-a-vis country. Therefore the accumulation of assets in country i on counterparties in country j is a capital out ‡ow from reporting country i to vis-a-vis country j, CO ijt . By limiting the country coverage to pairs of reporting countries, we also observe data when country j is a reporting country and country i is vis-a-vis. The accumulation of liabilities by banks in country j from counterparties in country i is simply the gross capital in ‡ows into j from i, CI jit . If all counterparties in the vis-a-vis country were banks, then in theory CO ijt = CI jit . A bank-to-bank capital out ‡ow from i to j we observe twice, as an asset when i is the reporting country and as a liability when j is the reporting country, but a capital out ‡ow from a bank in country i to a non-bank in country j we only observe when i is a reporting country.
This fact allows a convenient sensitivity test when using data for aggregate capital ‡ows.
Recall that aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are constructed by summing all bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows with the other countries in the sample:
Here when constructing the measure of aggregate capital ‡ows for country i, we are considering the data where country i is the reporting country. On the other hand we can construct the measure of aggregate capital ‡ows where country i is the vis-a-vis country:
The main results from the paper, both the regressions measuring the co-movement of aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the regressions measuring the cyclicality of aggregate capital ‡ows are presented in the top halves of tables 5 and 6. The tables show that the results are qualitatively and nearly quantitatively the same as in the main results in the last section. Aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows co-move positively, and capital out ‡ows are acyclical during normal times but strongly procyclical during crisis times.
Similarly, the way the data is constructed builds in a useful robustness check in the bilateral data. In the main analysis presented in the last section, we considered both country pairs ij and the opposite ji. This potentially double counts any capital ‡ows between BIS reporting banks, but it is sure to capture all capital ‡ows where a non-bank is a counterparty.
Alternatively we could restrict the analysis and allow each country pair to be counted only once. This would eliminate any double counting of bank-to-bank ‡ows but would exclude some bank-to-non-bank ‡ows. In this sensitivity analysis we will restrict attention to country pairs ij where the GDP per capita in country i is greater than that in country j.
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The main results from the paper, both the regressions measuring the co-movement of aggregate in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the regressions measuring the cyclicality of aggregate capital ‡ows are presented in the bottom halves of tables 5 and 6. Here we again see that bilateral capital ‡ows co-move positively after controlling for aggregate capital ‡ows.
Summary and Conclusion
The fact that capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are positively correlated poses a puzzle to our existing suite of international real business cycle models. This fact can be reconciled in a dynamic portfolio choice model by introducing country-speci…c risk shocks, but the results in this paper, with the high correlation between bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows, even after controlling for changes in aggregate capital ‡ows further complicates this puzzle.
The results in this paper show that a lot of this positive correlation between bilateral capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and thus between aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, may be driven by network e¤ects and non-diversi…cation in international banking relationships.
If this positive co-movement between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows is largely a product of banking network relationships and liquidity crises, then outside of these liquidity crisis periods, a more normal and relationship between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows should emerge.
Using data on bilateral capital ‡ows we can do exactly that, and while bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows tend to be procyclical in both countries in the bilateral pair, after controlling for crisis periods, during normal times capital in ‡ows tend to co-move positively with the country receiving the capital and negatively with the country sending the capital, exactly as theory would predict. T h e se sta tistic s a re c a lc u la te d fo r e a ch o f th e 2 9 c o u ntrie s in th e sa m p le a n d th is ta b le p re se nts e ith e r th e m e a n o r th e m e d ia n o f th o se 2 9 p o int e stim a te s. W h e n th e c o rre la tio n is ta ke n a c ro ss c o u ntrie s o r c o u ntry p a irs in a g ive n q u a rte r, th e se sta tistic s a re c a lc u la te d by ta k in g th e m e a n o r m e d ia n a c ro ss c o rre la tio n s in 6 8 q u a rte rs. W h e n th e c o rre la tio n is ta ke n a c ro ss q u a rte rs in a g ive n c o u ntry o r c o u ntry p a ir, th e se sta tistic s a re c a lc u la te d by ta k in g th e m e a n o r m e d ia n a c ro ss 2 3 c o u ntrie s (a g g re g a te ) o r 2 5 3 c o u ntry p a irs. N o te s: C ro ss-se c tio n a l …x e d e ¤e c ts a re c o u ntry …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f a g g re g a te g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s a n d c o u ntry -p a ir …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f b ila te ra l g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s. S ta n d a rd e rro rs in p a re nth e sis. * * * d e n o te s sig n i…c a n c e a t th e 1 % le ve l, * * a t th e 5 % le ve l, a n d * a t th e 1 0 % le ve l. N o te s: T h e c o e ¢ c ie nt in th e ta b le is th e su m o f th e c o e ¢ c ie nts fro m th e fo u r la g s o f G D P g row th . C ro ss-se c tio n a l …x e d e ¤e c ts a re c o u ntry …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f a g g re g a te g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s a n d c o u ntry -p a ir …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f b ila te ra l g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s. S ta n d a rd e rro rs in p a re nth e sis. * * * d e n o te s sig n i…c a n c e a t th e 1 % le ve l, * * a t th e 5 % le ve l, a n d * a t th e 1 0 % le ve l. N o te s: C ro ss-se c tio n a l …x e d e ¤e c ts a re c o u ntry …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f a g g re g a te g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s a n d c o u ntry -p a ir …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f b ila te ra l g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s. S ta n d a rd e rro rs in p a re nth e sis. * * * d e n o te s sig n i…c a n c e a t th e 1 % le ve l, * * a t th e 5 % le ve l, a n d * a t th e 1 0 % le ve l. N o te s: T h e c o e ¢ c ie nt in th e ta b le is th e su m o f th e c o e ¢ c ie nts fro m th e fo u r la g s o f G D P g row th . C ro ss-se c tio n a l …x e d e ¤e c ts a re c o u ntry …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f a g g re g a te g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s a n d c o u ntry -p a ir …x e d e ¤e c ts in th e c a se o f re g re ssio n s o f b ila te ra l g ro ss c a p ita l ‡ow s. S ta n d a rd e rro rs in p a re nth e sis. * * * d e n o te s sig n i…c a n c e a t th e 1 % le ve l, * * a t th e 5 % le ve l, a n d * a t th e 1 0 % le ve l.
